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Editorial Notes

WE shall be publishing later on a review by the Rev. E. C. Ratcliff of Dom Gregory Dix's great book *The Shape of the Liturgy* (Dacre Press, 45s.). We recommend all who can afford to purchase a copy to do so, while one may be had. It has been written for the readers of THEOLOGY—among others—and not, we mean, only for liturgical specialists.

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Many churchmen are now discussing together how they can best prepare for the return to the parishes of the men and women in the forces. *When They Return: the Church and Demobilization* (obtainable from the Ripon Diocesan Board of Finance, 5, Albion Place, Leeds, 1; 1s., post free) is a report on the subject prepared for the Bishop of Ripon and commended to his diocese. It deals with the kind of questions that Parochial Church Councils or Church Meetings everywhere ought to be considering. Although the Bishop begins his commendation with an inauspicious sentence about "the challenge of a vast opportunity," the report has the merit of being humdrum and of starting from where people are—no stunts, no dreams of a new world order, but what ought A and B, who are members of the Church of England, to do in their parishes during the next year or two?

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It is to be hoped that the new Archbishop of Canterbury may see his way to the formation of a general staff at Lambeth, both for his own sake and for the sake of the Church. We urged the need for this in 1942, when Archbishop Temple was appointed, and the idea has lately been revived in several quarters. If church reforms in England are to be carried through expeditiously, it will also be necessary to find some means of simplifying legislative procedure. Before Lord Lang laid down his office, he referred to this matter in Convocation, and the point must be driven home until some remedy is found. He said: "The Bishop of Norwich is entirely right in saying that there is no one in either Convocation who has more knowledge than myself of the enormous difficulties of getting things done in the existing system. I could enlarge on that theme with most pathetic eloquence—two Houses, two Convocations, each House and each Convocation jealous of its own independence and of its own rights and privileges, and both Houses and the two Convocations extremely sensitive on all these matters. The fact that they meet very seldom and meet separately makes the conduct of the business of the Church of England almost impossible."[1] Not to mention the Church Assembly!

[1] *Chronicle of Convocation*, May, 1941, pp. 99*f*.

Cheerfulness Breaks in[1]

The fruit of the Spirit is . . . joy.—Gal. v, 20.

. . . that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us: yea, and our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ: and these things we write that our (your) joy may be fulfilled.—1 John i, 3-4.

It was on Good Friday, 1778, that Dr Samuel Johnson, in his return from morning church, was accosted by his old fellow-collegian, Mr Edwards, whom he had not met for nearly fifty years, and who, after practising as a chancery solicitor, had retired to a little farm at Stevenage; and in the course of talk Edwards uttered the sentence which has made him famous for ever: "You are a philosopher, Dr Johnson. I have tried too in my time to be a philosopher; but, I don't know how, cheerfulness was always breaking in." Boswell says that Mr Burke, Sir Joshua Reynolds, Mr Courtenay, Mr Malone, and indeed all the eminent men to whom he had mentioned this, thought it an exquisite trait of character. But it may be doubted whether Edwards, who after all had had some education, and followed a learned profession, was as ingenuous as he appeared. Birkbeck Hill quotes in this connexion a letter by Horace Walpole a little earlier, which tells us that in Parisian society of the time "the generality of the men are dull and empty: they have taken up gravity, thinking it was philosophy and English, and so have acquired nothing in the room of their natural levity and cheerfulness." And if Edwards had perused *The Rambler* and read *Rasselas*, he may well have felt that in avoiding levity his illustrious friend had not wholly escaped the ponderous and the gloomy. Be that as it may, it is pleasant to observe that Edwards seems to have rendered the sage for once speechless: for Boswell records no retort.

The gentle humour of the scene, however, does not exhaust its interest. Johnson had no lack of matter on this theme. His beloved Burton, the one author who could shake him out of his morning torpor, had set melancholy among the "five principal plagues of students, a common maul unto them all."[2] And Johnson knew enough moral theology—if only from Chaucer—to be aware how sadness and listlessness go hand-in-hand with the sin of accidie or sloth. The connexion of the two ideas is maintained in his Dictionary by the definition of "cheerfulness" as "freedom from dejection, alacrity"—which last word has survived into the Oxford Dictionary. Two years before, when Boswell (as young people will sometimes do when they want to be petted) had written to him about an attack of melancholy, Johnson had replied "with a good deal of severity and reproof" bidding Boswell avoid the "foolish notion that melancholy is a proof of acuteness" and "very angry that" Boswell "managed himself so ill"; and next year he was to write to Dr Taylor of Ashbourne: "Sadness only multiplies self. Let us do our duty and be cheerful."[3] And Johnson—who, we re-

[1] A sermon preached before the University of Oxford on October 22, 1944.
[2] *Anatomy*, I, ii, 3, 15. [3] H. Kingsmill, *Johnson Without Boswell*, p. 197.

member, had in childhood learnt his Church collects—doubtless knew the modern collect of this twentieth Sunday after Trinity, in which we pray that "we may cheerfully accomplish those things that thou wouldest have done." He may not have known that what is now the dominant word, "cheerfully," is one of the very numerous changes made in the collects at the Restoration, this collect having previously since Cranmer run in a fairly close translation of the original Latin: "that we, being ready both in body and soul may with free hearts accomplish those things that thou wouldest have done." Yet the characteristic xvii-century word may well have come in through a bishop of his native Lichfield, Dr Hacket, who was a member of the Savoy Conference. And Johnson had the clue in his hand: for he undoubtedly was familiar with the good bishop's tomb, and with the characteristic motto "on the Coat of Arms at the Feet":[1] "Inservi Deo et laetare." Now, when we turn to Dr Johnson's *Prayers and Meditations*, that little book before which the comic spirit is hushed into reverence, we find that just about this time Hacket's motto had worked its way into the innermost sanctuary of Johnson's penitence and resolve. He knew all too well how sluggishness, especially that morning sluggishness with which he reproached himself, was bound up with melancholy, that melancholy which sometimes terrified him. A year after rating Boswell, he himself had prayed, in preparation for his Easter Communion, that he might serve God "with pure affection and a cheerful mind"; and he had recorded a resolution: "Vita ordinanda; Biblia legenda; Theologiæ opera danda; Serviendum et laetandum."[2] And his real response to Edwards's remark is to be found in his devotions, written thirty-six hours after this encounter, in preparation for his Easter Communion of 1778, where, amid fervent and touching piety, we find the old resolution repeated in English: "To study divinity. . . . To be diligent in my undertakings. To serve and trust God, and be cheerful." Edwards had touched his old friend on a tender spot. Johnson knew that cheerfulness was a Christian duty; and to fail in joy was to fail in a Christian grace.

In Christian thought, joy, and even cheerfulness, appears as an inseparable concomitant of the good life, a quality to be aimed at in conduct and sought in devotion. So what, we ask, is the nature and importance of this grace? How does it make its way into what may be called the Christian philosophy of self-management? And how has Christianity modified or developed the idea of it?

If we examine the New Testament for the first emergence of this Christian grace, four facts appear to stand out. The first fact, which is numerically by far the most noticeable, is this: Joy appears as a quality of the Christian *community*, and commonly as produced by the Christian progress of others. In the gospels the Saviour exults over truths revealed to babes, and depicts the joy in the home of the returning prodigal and in the presence of the angels over repentant sinners; St Paul, being reconciled with his troublesome Corinthians, declares himself a fellow-worker of their joy; his happy relations with the

[1] B. Willis, *A Survey of the Cathedrals*, i, 396.

[2] Ed. H. E. Savage, p. 90.

Philippians are marked by joy, and increase their advancement and joy of faith; the Thessalonian Christians are his joy and crown of elation, his glory and joy; to him it is a Christian's duty to rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep; Christian assemblies for worship—such seems to be the allusion—are marked by singing and melody in the heart; and in Galatians joy is reckoned among the graces which adorn and sweeten the *common* life: the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace. Secondly, we note that this joy is a *spiritual* thing, unimpaired by tribulation: Christ bids His people rejoice and exult when reviled and persecuted; St Paul rejoices in his sufferings on behalf of the Colossians, and describes Christians as men grieved yet alway rejoicing; St James bids them count it all joy to fall into manifold trials. Thirdly—but the *rarity* of this feature is surprising in such an eschatological scene—Christian joy is in part a joy of *hope*; in the fourth gospel Christ says: "I will see you again, and your joy no man taketh from you"; First Peter bids its readers rejoice in Christ's sufferings, so that in the revelation of His glory they may rejoice exultingly; and St Paul bids them rejoice in hope. Lastly, we find that it is a joy *in God, in Christ, in the Holy Spirit.* First Peter writes to men who, though they have not seen Christ, and do not look upon Him now, yet believing in Him exult with joy unspeakable and irradiated with glory; and "rejoice in the Lord," says St Paul three times in his happiest epistle; the kingdom of God, he says, is righteousness and peace and joy in Holy Spirit; and he counts joy among the fruit of the Spirit. In sum, the New Testament gives the impression that the new fellowship of Christians in the spirit has brought into prominence a quality of joy, in which the word is no philosophic abstraction, no technical term really meaning something else (doggedness, say, or resignation or self-centred equanimity), nor yet a psychological cloak for a subconscious pessimism, but expresses an active and positive quality which would be recognized as joy by ordinary, unsophisticated people, by children, for example, or the unphilosophic Mr Edwards.

Doctrines and theories of joy were not wanting among the philosophic directors of the world in which Christianity was proclaimed. They are scarcely to be sought among the ancients: in Aristotle joy is just one of those affections which may befall men;[1] and though doubtless there is a healthful mean[2] it is not accounted among the virtues; only it is good for a man to rejoice and be grieved about the right things,[3] so that rejoicing becomes the natural accompaniment of virtuous activity,[4] with all of which the Christian need have no quarrel. A theory of joy can be found in the more individualistic teachers of the Hellenistic age. Cicero, here following Stoic masters, distinguishes between *gaudium* and *laetitia*: as the wise man's caution is to another man's fear, so is the wise man's joy or *gaudium* to another man's *laetitia.* The wise man's joy exists when, being in possession of a good, the mind is moved in company with reason, placidly and constantly; but when the mind exults emptily and effusively, this is excited joy (*laetitia gestiens*), de-

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, 1105b, 22.
[2] *Ib.* 1108a, 31-2.
[3] *Ib.* 1104b, 12; *cf.* 1179b, 25.
[4] *Ib.* 1152b, 5 *ff.*

finable as an elation of the mind apart from reason.[1] There is here no question about right or wrong *objects* of joy; it is a question of avoiding perturbations of mind, which destroy self-possession. A little later, indeed, Cicero becomes almost Pauline in his warning against malevolence, which rejoices in another man's misfortune; but in reality the fault even of this is solely that it disturbs the wise man's equanimity; and he is equally warned against pity, which consists in distress over another man's unhappiness.[2] Here, surely, is a view far distant from the naturalness of the early Christians, rejoicing with them that do rejoice and weeping with them that weep. In Seneca, who uses *gaudium* and *laetitia* interchangeably, we find a doctrine of the *duty* of joy. The foundation and summit of the good man is, "Rejoice not in vain things."[3] It is a duty to "learn to rejoice," in poverty, self-restraint and endurance: "Believe me," he says, "true joy is an austere thing"; and true joy is the lot of the wise man alone.[4] Mr Edwards might here interject: "But this is not what I call joy." Yet in Seneca there is much that is shared with Christianity. He is joyous in tribulation, even perhaps protesting too much in an attack of asthma; and he says that two good men can increase each other's joy and faithfulness, as it were pacing one another in the race.[5] But he too makes of his joy a self-enwrapped thing and forbids the wise man to speak of rejoicing in other folk's marriages or children.[6] He even finds a certain joy in the indwelling of God. Yet how far removed is this from the Christian's assured rejoicing in the Lord! Seneca will speak in the same breath of the sacred spirit which indwells the wise man and of plural gods; and when (rather beautifully) he likens a good man to a sacred grove, awe-inspiring and indwelt by a god, he will add: "What god, is uncertain."[7] The same fumbling, not quite serious, theology spoils even the lovely passages (in themselves fully Christian) in which Epictetus describes himself, lame old man as he is, praising God like swan or nightingale,[8] and declares that to have God as creator and father and protector is a release from all griefs and fears;[9] but then slips into speaking of gods, the divine and fates indiscriminately. In such contexts there can never be the robust joy which we find in Christianity: a heritage of polytheism makes what the Christian calls joy in God as impossible as polygamy makes true conjugal bliss. And the fact is that while Christianity may find a certain affinity in these good men, there is not in them the joy of the New Testament, at once spiritual and unaffected, of a people claiming to be fellow-servants of the true creator and guardian and father of mankind.

If we pursue the theme into the Latin fathers we find (unless misled by subject indexes) that a certain change of emphasis seems to come over the New Testament view. The philosophic distinction of true and false joy recurs in a new form of spiritual and mundane.[10] This is sound

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[1] *Tusc.* iv, 11-13. [2] *Ib.*, 18, 20. [3] Ep. xxiii.
[4] Ep. lix. [5] Ep. cix, 5. [6] Ep. lix.
[7] Ep. xli, 2. [8] i, 16, 20. [9] i, 9, 7.
[10] St Aug., *Enarr. in Ps.* lvii, 12; cxxv, 2.

enough in a way, but it may be pressed in a St Gregory[1] to a point of asceticism which renders earthly joy an evil, and makes joy itself an abstraction which might have bewildered Mr Edwards. A change comes too in the new and constant stress on the difference between the uncertainty of this world and the certainty of things hoped for in the next, between journey and fruition, which seems now as prominent as in the New Testament is the thought of a present shared joy. Yet the Christian joy in other people's progress ever remains: the greatest joy in life, says St Augustine, is over a sinner's conversion;[2] and seven centuries later Eadmer, the biographer of St Anselm, was to write down a noble passage of his master's teaching, in which the joy of the blessed hereafter is declared to be magnified a million millionfold, as each shares and reflects and multiplies the joy of all the others in the beatific vision, and there is joy within and joy without, joy above and joy below, joy around and joy everywhere, the joy that God has prepared for them that love Him.[3] In the fathers, a very active joy still accompanies suffering: "sorrowful yet alway rejoicing" is a favourite quotation. And the philosophic restriction of joy to the wise recurs Christianized in the frequent insistence that "there is no rejoicing for the wicked, saith the Lord."[4] But above all in frequency is the iteration that the Christian rejoices and must rejoice "in the Lord," or "in the Lord alone." Does this seem merely a conventional repetition of an empty catch-phrase? He would be a very superficial critic who said so. For the Christian, who inherited all the joy of the Hebrew monotheist greatly rejoicing in the God of his salvation,[5] was speaking of what he had seen and known when he spoke of joy in God, and found a full delight therein. The Christian tradition seems to be summed up by St Thomas Aquinas, when, true alike to Aristotle and St Paul, he said that joy was not indeed a virtue (though sorrow and sloth be sins) but was a "fruit" annexed by the divine Spirit to the operation of the virtue of charity or love of God and imparted therewith by the indwelling of grace.[6] In fact, joy in Christianity may sometimes be sicklied over with ecclesiastical convention; but it remains true to its nature, the active fruit in an ordinary social life of the love of a known and active God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

It will be an evil day when Christianity ceases to care for the personal graces which spring from the Spirit. Prophetic voices call us—rightly no doubt—to manage the world upon Christian principles: it would be an evil day if Christianity forgot its heritage from the world of its origin and ceased to teach men to manage themselves. It is an evil day when humane and theological study becomes a mere record of convictions which mankind have held apart from any conviction of its own, or a listing of ethical systems, like highroads, apart from any suggestion that one road is more to be followed than another. It will be in vain that men spend their intellect in planning a better order, if men themselves are too tired or too sluggish, too lacking in faith

[1] St Greg. *in Ps.* xxxvi, 14; *Mor. in Job*, xvi, 10.
[2] Ep. 264 (275), 2.
[3] *De Beatitudine Caelesti*, Migne, clix, col. 599.
[4] St Jer. *in Gal.* v, 23; St Greg. *in Ps.* xxxvi, 14; Isa. xlviii, 22, lvii, 21, O.L. (LXX).
[5] Isa. lxi, 10; Hab. iii, 18.
[6] II, ii, Q. xxviii.

and alacrity, to work apace in bringing it about, and think scorn of the pleasant land which they ought to seek. It must ever be an important part of the Church's business to guard men and mankind from that disastrous mixture of sadness and sloth which Christians call accidie, and to bring both wise and simple to that cheerful frame of mind which is at once a precondition and a consequence of the good life, that they, being ready in body and soul, may cheerfully accomplish good things. The Church—aberrations apart—has not been blind to the commonsense of the matter, and the bearing of physical conditions upon it. But its great teaching is that true joy, here and hereafter, is to be found in the love of God, being at once a part of that duty and a fruit of it; that in order to serve men without growing weary in well-doing it is needful first to serve God; that the fellowship of Christians in His service is the sphere in which all true joy is to be found here and hereafter; and that the God who is so to be served is the known God of the Christians, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus, the fruit of whose Spirit is love and joy and peace and the rest.

EDWARD SWANSEA & BRECON.

William King, the Man and his Work

WILLIAM KING is entitled to an honoured place among the great leaders of life and thought who redeem a somewhat gloomy period in English and Irish history—namely, the closing half of the seventeenth century and the opening decades of the eighteenth. Justice has been already done to his career as administrator and ecclesiastic,[1] but insufficient notice has been taken of his contributions to the philosophical and theological speculation in which his age abounded. The urge to put religion on a rational basis, characteristic of much of the writings of the eighteenth century, finds notable expression both in his *magnum opus*, *De Origine Mali*, and in his much-discussed sermon (or treatise) on *Predestination*. The former work attracted attention, at the time of its publication, on the Continent, and, though little immediate interest was shown by King's contemporaries in these countries, it found its way into the University curriculum both at Dublin and at Cambridge. The latter work is famous because of King's doctrine that the Divine attributes are not to be understood as the same in God as they are in man, but merely as *analogical* representations. The doctrine, developed by the celebrated Peter Browne, was devastatingly assailed by Berkeley in his *Alciphron*, who maintained that it leads to atheism.

Before dealing with King's work as a philosopher and theologian, it will be useful to give a short summary of his career as statesman and administrator. Living as he did during the period of "the close alliance of Church and State," as Dr Chart terms it,[2] King more than once held high office concurrently in them both. Indeed, one of his claims

[1] Notably by G. T. Stokes, *Some Worthies of the Irish Church*.
[2] *History of the Church of Ireland*, ed. Alison Philips, vol. iii, pp. 175*f*.

to fame is his success as a leader in the Government while he continued to serve the best interests of the Church of Ireland, whose welfare always had first claims on his attention.

The significant phase in the public life of the future Archbishop begins in the year 1679, when he moved from Tuam to Dublin, and, thanks to Archbishop Parker, a benefactor to whom King owed much, he became Chancellor of St Patrick's and Rector of St Werburgh's. Nine years later he became Dean of St Patrick's, and thus during the momentous days of the Revolution King was one of the prominent leaders of Irish life.

The Revolution brought to King, as it did to many others, a serious moral problem. Having taken solemn oaths of allegiance to King James and having preached the doctrine of non-resistance, how could he espouse the cause of William of Orange? In the event William King, and the majority of churchmen, at an apparent cost of consistency, welcomed King William and he became one of the foremost supporters of the Revolution. It has been suggested that in all this King was "a trimmer who shaped his sails to catch the breezes." He was violently attacked in his own day by the distinguished non-juror Charles Leslie. King had written an *apologia* for his change of allegiance in the form of a weighty indictment of James the Second, entitled *The State of the Protestants in Ireland under the late King James's Government.* Leslie replied to King in a volume entitled *An Answer to a Book intituled The State of the Protestants in Ireland under the late King James's Government.* This is one of the few cases in his controversial discussions in which King seems to have had an opponent worthy of his steel. However, in spite of the apparent weakness of his case, King's conduct can be vindicated. He had himself espoused the cause of William when it was unsafe to do so and had twice suffered imprisonment for his views. In addition to this, as Dr Lawlor maintains, King never held the doctrine of non-resistance without qualification. In common with others, he held that Passive Obedience was a duty so long as the monarch acted constitutionally, and no longer. Convinced that the limit had been reached in the case of King James, he no longer felt bound to give allegiance to the king.[1]

Shortly after the Williamite settlement William King was made Bishop of Derry, being consecrated at Christ Church Cathedral, Dublin, on January 25, 1691. He at once repaired to his new diocese and there began to set in motion a series of much-needed reforms. Churches were rebuilt and repaired, schools opened and the regular performance of Church services ordered.

The new Bishop soon found himself engaged in religious controversy. He had already vindicated the Anglican position against Roman Catholic claims, as these found expression in the *apologia* of a former Dean of Derry, Peter Danby, who had left the Church of Ireland and had joined the Church of Rome. Now King entered the lists against Nonconformity, publishing a book entitled *Discourse on the Inventions*

[1] Dr Lawlor deals with the charge of inconsistency made against King in a note attached to chapter vii of Stokes' *Some Worthies of the Irish Church.*

of Men in the Worship of God. This work is really a popular version of Hooker's *rationale* of Anglicanism, and it was followed by two other books on the same subject, *An Admonition*[1] and *A Second Admonition.* The significance of King's controversial writings for Anglican thought and practice will be considered later.

In 1703 Bishop King was translated to Dublin. Here again he found plenty of scope for his reforming zeal: rebuilding ruined churches, building new ones, enforcing residence on the clergy, "cleaning-up" Christ Church Cathedral and its Chapter, and improving in many directions the finances of the Church and archdiocese.

William King more than once occupied a leading position in the government of the country. He was, however, no mere "yes-man" and several times fell foul of the authorities. In 1719 he was omitted from the Commission of the Lord Justices, a position which he had filled with distinction for some years previously and which he held four times in his life. He never allowed himself to forget that he was primarily a Bishop of the Church and refused to immerse himself in purely secular work. In 1724 he might have succeeded to the Primacy, in succession to Archbishop Lindsay, had he been willing to solicit political support, an idea wholly foreign to his character and temperament. There are indications, too, that King felt unhappy about the Church's intimate association with the political régime. Indeed he himself[2] declared that the Church was "better off" in the reign of William and Mary, when it was " no great favourite," than in the days of Queen Anne's encouragement, when the clergy were tempted to trust to political rather than spiritual methods in order to make their influence felt.

Stokes has said of King that he was "pre-eminently a Christian metaphysician, philosopher and speculator." This language is somewhat daring, for his chief claims to fame lie in his success as an ecclesiastic and man of affairs. None the less his writings, controversial and otherwise, deserve careful attention. The most important of them all, *De Origine Mali*, was written during the closing years of his Derry episcopate. It was published in Latin in 1702, and translated into English by Edmund Law, afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, in 1730. In the concluding extant portion of his autobiographical notes King writes: "In the year 1697 I produced a book entitled *De Origine Mali.* Mr Bayle published strictures on it before he had read it; it will not seem wonderful that they were marked neither by sense nor force of argument, when the book was not otherwise known to him than from a summary, or abridged narration of it, which Mr Bernard, a learned man, contributed to a certain French work. . . . Afterwards Wolff, in a book written in Latin, attacked some things in mine. Lastly, an anonymous writer in a French book with a title *Tentamen* . . . The first [of these writers] attacked impudently and impiously those points I had put forward, the second without much acumen, but seriously, and with a certain gravity, and the third modestly and carefully but

[1] The full title is *An Admonition to the Dissenting Inhabitants of the Diocese of Derry.*
[2] See *A Great Archbishop of Dublin,* by C. S. King, p. 120.

not with force." The anonymous writer to whom reference is here made is Leibniz, whose doctrine of evil, though it goes far beyond that of King, bears some resemblance to it, as we shall see later.

King's interest in philosophical questions goes back to his undergraduate days when the influence of Dodwell, who lectured him in Logic, and of his tutor, Christian, made him think out the implications of his faith. Further, his friendship with Peter Browne, to whom he sent an early copy of *De Origine Mali* for review, and his membership of Molyneux's *Conventio Philosophica* testify to an unusual interest in philosophical questions.

But why did King's interest concentrate itself on the question of the Origin of Evil? Ostensibly the answer is that it arose out of learned discussions between King and Sir Robert Southwell, to whom *De Origine Mali* was dedicated. But the real influences lie deeper still. An experience which befell him when a child, and which made a deep impression on him, is of interest here.[1] Having related in his autobiographical sketch that as a child he had had serious difficulties in learning to read, and having told how "when the Westminster Catechism was put into my hands I did not understand the words, nor was I capable of understanding what I read, and was disgusted with books," King goes on: "It happened on a certain Lord's Day, that I was walking about with a woman in the garden, and we entered the wood and sat down together; she was reading the Holy Scriptures, and whilst reading sleep stole over her. I took the book falling from her hands, and by enumerating the letters, according to my habit, I pronounced the words in its beginning, and immediately perceived it to contain some sense, which I had never before observed; much captivated with the novelty I so earnestly aspired to read, that I ran through the first three chapters, while she was sleeping, sticking fast in very few places. As soon as possible when settled at home, I procured books, and made unexpected progress in reading, and having passed by all my equals, I gave hope that I was capable of learning."

Thus it happened that, when eight years old, the future Archbishop was introduced to the opening chapter of Genesis, with their incomparable account of the origin of evil. The incident, as we have said, made a deep impression on King's mind and must have predisposed him to grapple with the problem of evil when he reached maturity.

Now, as it happens, this very problem had been raised afresh, and in a very striking way, in contemporary philosophical thought. The author of the controversy on the question was Pierre Bayle, author of the famous *Dictionnaire historique et critique*. His main position lies in a conviction that philosophy cannot be reconciled with the dogmas of religion, and in particular with the doctrine of the Fall. In his article on the *Manichæans* Bayle put forward the position that the Manichæan doctrine of two world principles, one good and one evil, answered to human experience much better than the orthodox Christian doctrine. Leibniz replied to Bayle in his *Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal*. Here Leibniz

[1] *A Great Archbishop of Dublin*, p. 3.

is designedly trying to solve the problem of how to reconcile the belief in the origin of the world in an all-powerful, all-good and all-wise Being with the existence of moral and physical evil in the world. Leibniz's work was published in 1710, and it is in this work that he wrote a detailed criticism of King's *De Origine Mali*.

To return to Bayle, whose views were familiar to King when he wrote his *magnum opus*, and his literary activity. In 1684 he started a literary journal entitled *Nouvelles de la République des lettres*, a journal in which, under Bernard's editorship, Archbishop King's work was reviewed. His chief work, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, was first published in 1696. This work, banned in Holland and in France, was translated into other European languages. In it Bayle devotes considerable space to criticism of Leibniz and other philosophers. In his articles on *Manichæan*, *Paulician*, *Zoroaster*, *Marcionite*, Bayle had taken the view that reason and religion were not to be reconciled, and that reason justified the Manichæan, rather than the Christian, doctrine of evil. And not only reason but the experience of mankind strengthens the Manichæan case. All the unhappiness and sin in the world testifies to the existence of two world-principles, one good and one evil. Bayle made the further deduction that moral character can flourish independently of religious belief.

King's *De Origine Mali* and Leibniz's *Théodicée* are both directed against the doctrines of Bayle outlined in the *Dictionnaire*. Someone has called this work the arsenal from which Rationalists drew philosophical arguments for use against Christianity. The contents of it, certainly in so far as they give Bayle's views of the nature and origin of evil, were well known to King when he wrote *De Origine Mali*, which was published eight years before the *Théodicée* of Leibniz.

When *De Origine Mali* appeared it was favourably reviewed by M. Bernard, "a learned man" King calls him, in *Nouvelles de la République des lettres*. Bayle proceeded to criticize King's doctrine without having first read *De Origine Mali*, and only having a summary of it made by Bernard before him. King, as we have seen, sharply retorted that "it will not seem wonderful that they [Bayle's criticisms] were marked neither by sense nor force of argument."

Leibniz paid high tribute to Archbishop King's book, though he found himself in constant opposition to the ideas propounded in the second half of the book, where the author deals with the question of moral evil.

I have already spoken of Leibniz and King as opponents of Bayle's "Manichæan" doctrine. Leibniz solved the problem of evil by teaching that this world is the best of all possible worlds. On this teaching evil is only a form of good or it is something essential to good. This doctrine of Leibniz is really a revival of Stoicism and of the doctrines of St Augustine. Archbishop King did not go as far as Leibniz and represent evil as a form of good. He contents himself with showing that the existence of evil is consistent with the character of God and looks upon evil as a necessary effect of freedom.

I have spoken of the influence which made William King tackle the problem of evil, suggesting that interest in the question may be traced

to an experience in his childhood; noting too that Bayle had raised the whole question afresh in contemporary philosophical thought.

There is another influence, and one "nearer home," to which reference must now be made. The fact is that the problem of evil became acute with the rise of Deism. As thought became less Christian, the problem of evil *became* a problem. The rise of natural religion meant the denial of redemption and with it the loss of the specifically Christian answer to the existence of evil—*i.e.*, that "the bane and the antidote are both before us"; the fact of man's sin and the fact of God's action in saving him, these are facts which stand together. Deism tries to think of God after a Christian fashion, but denies the experiences and events which make it possible so to conceive Him. God made the world and allowed sin to enter the world but, by hypothesis, He is precluded from taking any action to save the world. Deism "creates" a problem of evil, but does not attempt to solve it. The only solution, if it be a solution, open to the Deist is what we should today call "escapism." Hence the shallow optimism of the eighteenth century which finds notable expression in Pope's *Essay on Man*. It has been alleged that Pope drew inspiration for the essay from King's *De Origine Mali*. It is a question whether King's book does not suffer from the "rationalism" opposition to which helped to provoke him to write it. From different angles Leibniz, Pope and King all believe that "this is the best of all possible worlds." Leibniz and King, however, unlike Pope, are rational *theists*.

R. R. Hartford.

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Who are made Diocesan Bishops?

An inquiry into the appointments during the years 1919-1939

There has been much discussion as to whether the present methods of appointing bishops in the Church of England are satisfactory. This article does no more than inquire what kind of clergymen are in fact appointed under the present system, and for this purpose the twenty years 1919-39 have been selected.

During these years there were five premiers—D. Lloyd George, A. Bonar Law, S. Baldwin, J. R. MacDonald and N. Chamberlain. They were drawn from all three political parties and belonged to various religious denominations. These premiers nominated 53 new diocesan bishops, and 6 diocesans already in office when the period starts were moved from one diocese to another. Of these 59 prelates 10 were translated later once, and one, Dr Guy Warman, twice within our period.

First let us ask: What were the offices they held immediately prior to their appointment? The table on page 61 is the answer.

Some of course were archdeacons as well as suffragan bishops, and many were incumbents also. Each prelate is included according to his highest office. Of the archdeacons 3 came from Coventry and 2 from Oakham; 2 bishops of Gibraltar, 2 of Stepney, 2 of Dover, 2 deans of

English Diocesan Bishop	17
Overseas Diocesan Bishop	4
Bishop Suffragan	11
Dean of Cathedral	5
Archdeacon	12
Canon of Westminster	2
Parochial Incumbency	7
Head of Oxford College	5
Professor of Divinity	2
Headmaster	2
Monk	1
Principal of Theological College	1
Secretary of Missionary Society	1
Chaplain to Archbishop	1
	71

Bristol, 2 vicars of Portsea and 2 of Bradford also became English diocesans.

At first sight this looks as if the patrons of certain livings had an unusual share in these appointments, but it must be remembered that the Crown fills the vacancy caused by the appointment of a bishop. This means that the Crown appointed, *e.g.*, two rectors of Rugby (who were made Archdeacons of Coventry) who were afterwards raised to the episcopate. Apart from such instances, the offices from which these prelates came were sufficiently varied.

How about the previous experience of these 59 clergymen? 44 had been incumbents at some time in their ministry, 6 had been curates only, and 9 had had no parochial experience whatever. It is noticeable that while only 8 had had ministerial experience abroad, 31 had been university dons or on the staff of a theological college; 9 had been schoolmasters, of whom 7 had been heads of public schools (2 of Winchester and 2 of Repton); 6 had acted as domestic chaplain to a bishop (3 of them to an archbishop), and 9 had been organizing secretaries of some kind.

With regard to academic qualifications, no one reached the episcopal bench who had not been to a university: 39 had been to Oxford, 18 to Cambridge, 1 to Durham and 1 to London. 29 obtained first-class honours and 24 other honours at the older universities. Of the 57 Oxford and Cambridge men 37 read classics, 17 theology, 7 history, 3 mathematics, 1 moral science and 1 law. In view of the present-day policy it is interesting to note that only 24 went to a theological college.

Of their family connexions less can be ascertained, but from Official Year Books, etc., it appears that 8 were connected by birth or marriage with the titled aristocracy, being either like Dr Herbert the grandson of a peer or like Dr Bardsley married to the daughter of a baronet. 28 were clergymen's sons, of whom 3 were bishops' (Temple, Chavasse and Perowne), 1 a dean's, 1 an archdeacon's, 7 canons', and 1 (Lang) was the son of a Presbyterian minister, and 1 (Hunter) the son of a Congregationalist minister. 4 were sons of doctors and 3 of soldiers

(White-Thompson, Herbert and Blunt). Of the 48 who married, 10 married a daughter of a clergyman, 1, Dr Lisle Carr, a bishop's daughter.

This means that nearly one-half came from clerical homes, one in seven were connected with the nobility and one in fifteen were sons or sons-in-law of former diocesan bishops. As a whole they cannot have come from poor homes since 51 were educated at public schools and 2 privately; concerning the remaining 6 no information is available, but probably they went to those minor private schools which flourished so luxuriously in the period when they were growing up. No bishop has admitted he was educated at an elementary school. He probably never was.

Of the public schools Marlborough provided the largest number (7), then came Eton (5), Harrow (3), and Winchester (3). Bradfield, Liverpool College, Shrewsbury, Sherborne, Rugby and Westminster each supplied 2, while 21 other schools provided 1 each: Blackheath, Christ's Hospital, City of London, Cheltenham, Clifton, Dulwich, Durham, Exeter, Haileybury, Kelvinside Academy, King Edward Birmingham, Lancaster Royal Grammar, Leeds Grammar, Leys, Merchant Taylors, Portsmouth Grammar, Repton, Rossall, Sheffield Royal Grammar, St Peter's York, Stony Stratford.

The average age at which these bishops were appointed was 52, and they were generally 6 years older if and when they were translated to another see. The youngest appointment was Dr Temple at 40, the oldest Dr Hone, who at 65 became Bishop of Wakefield after having been a suffragan bishop in the same diocese for some years.

What inferences do these facts suggest? The most striking is that the bench of bishops was mainly drawn from the classical schools of Oxford and Cambridge. More than half read classics, but only a quarter read theology for a degree. Drs Garbett, Hensley Henson and Underhill took history only. Dr Barnes is singular in that the whole of his academic qualifications were in mathematics. This may explain some of his difficulties in his dealings with his episcopal and clerical brethren. He was also the only F.R.S. on the bench.

But what can only be noted with alarm is that not one single member of the bench had been trained on the natural science side. In view of the vast development and growing influence which this department of learning is having on modern life, the lack must be considered a serious handicap to the bench, and possibly explains a certain hesitancy observed when dealing with this subject.

Another striking fact is the proportion of men who in the course of their careers had taught in schools or colleges. Over one-half had been university dons. This may show the intellectual character of the episcopate, but dons and schoolmasters are not usually conspicuous for enterprise. Academic qualifications appear to have been rated too highly, for it is surely a weakness that 9 bishops—*i.e.*, over a sixth—had had no parochial experience whatever.

From the social point of view the picture is much the same. The predominance of the public-school class is very clear: 51 out of 59 claimed to be so educated. While a few relations of the aristocracy

were to be found on the bench no titled individual was present. It is obvious that as a body they were not appointed for that reason. But from the particulars available it is exceedingly unlikely that any of them had a father who was a weekly wage earner. Middle class at least were their origins. It is certainly not true that the ministry of the Church of England can yet be described as a career open to all the talents. It would be interesting to know to what extent those who were appointed to positions of leadership in other religious bodies in England shared the qualifications of the bishops of the Established Church. Not much has yet been done to implement all the fine talk about equality of opportunity, so far as the episcopal bench is concerned at least.

Indeed it makes one wonder whether Charles Marson, if he were alive today, would have had any need to alter his racy words written in 1914 in his book *God's Co-operative Society*.

> The list of Pauline cautions for bishops seems to point to a set of men quite different from those moderate and discreet gentlemen whom the civil government delights to honour, and whom the Prime Minister . . . appoints to the charge of Christ's visible kingdom. The Apostle, when he advised these holy fathers, thinks it necessary to warn them not to be too dashing and devil-may-care, to restrain their runaway enthusiasm for girls, to limit their hearty eupeptic sleep, to master their vigorous appetites, to keep within bounds, to love foreigners, to help lame dogs. They are to stop at the third glass, to keep their knuckles out of other folk's faces, to be genuine, unpeevish, above the passion for endowments, holding Mrs Bishop in with a tight rein and having the naughty little bishops well in hand. Should St Paul not rather have warned them against excess in tea and mineral waters and gossip? Should he not have dropped some admonitions against being safe men in any other sense than that of the Athanasian Creed? . . . it is obvious that he was eyeing a different stamp of man from those who now adorn and polish the Bench, to wit, heavy, hearty, muscular, bass-voiced men, who took life with voracity, who knew little of the sweets of flattery, of chaplains, of decorum; men who were like, and often were, village blacksmiths rather than college dons. Indeed, Celsus depicts them when he describes the Christians as the sort of men you would collect to make a band of robbers. . . .
>
> There seems to be no provision for training bishops, no staff college: and it is not our use to supply an honest shrewd man to jog one elbow, while a trained theologian jogs the other, which was the medieval plan. It has been suggested that the Athenæum Club really supplies all these needs, although even that may be disputed.

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Warrington.

Donald A. Smart.

BOOK REVIEWS

What is Christian Marriage? By Arthur Tarleton Macmillan. Macmillan. 8s. 6d.

In this little book of 143 pages Mr Macmillan makes an important contribution to the handling of the difficult problem created for the

Church of England by the rapid growth in the number of divorces. The problem arises, of course, from the insistence by the Church on her traditional doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage, and the widespread and increasing rejection or ignorance of this doctrine by the English people. Mr Macmillan's first objective is to enable the ordinary man, with no technical knowledge, to understand what the problem is and how it has arisen, by giving him a simple account of the essential facts. After a brief review of marriage laws and customs before Christianity, he gives a brilliant survey of the law and teaching of the Church, through the centuries of the Christian era—brilliant, because it is at once brief, lucid and comprehensive. Anyone who has read the four chapters which make up the central part of this book may be sure that he has a generally accurate outline of the Christian doctrine and law of marriage. The next chapter and a half gives an account of the present position under English law; it explains in what respects the statute law of England on marriage has come to differ from the canon law, in what respects the decisions of particular cases has widened that divergence, and from what causes it has come about that now " Parliament legislates on marriage as, in its wisdom, it thinks best for the community as a whole . . . without necessary reference to the doctrinal views of the Church of England or of any religious body." In pursuing the first objective, that of setting out the problem, Mr Macmillan is entirely successful and deserves our warmest thanks.

But it is clear that to his mind the most important part of the book, and his chief reason for writing it, are the suggestions for alteration of the Church's law with which he ends the book. He is convinced—we can only hope that he is right in this conviction—that Parliament now recognizes the right of the Church of England to legislate on marriage for her own members. He bases this conviction on the proviso in the "Herbert Act" that no clergyman shall be compelled to solemnize, or to allow to be solemnized in his church, a marriage of a divorced person. "This provision," he says, "is not only a full recognition by Parliament of the right of the Church to decide for herself on the question of remarriage after divorce, but it also recognizes that Parliament legislates independently of, and possibly contrary to, the law of the Church." If Mr Macmillan's conclusion from this is right, it is very important. I am only sceptical because I seem to remember that the Ecclesiastical Committee advised against a Church Assembly measure which made it an offence punishable by deprivation for a clergyman to contract marriage with a divorced woman, on the ground that this touched the common law rights of all subjects, and might therefore be rejected by the House of Commons. This was in 1937. Still, the Ecclesiastical Committee may have been wrong, and Mr Macmillan be right. Let us hope so.

On this assumption Mr Macmillan recommends first that the Church should declare invalid all marriages between a baptized Christian and an unbaptized person, thus reviving the old impediment of *disparitas cultus*. This would involve, as a corollary, I suppose, that any baptized person who, in the face of such a canon, contracted a marriage of this kind would be deemed to be living in concubinage and be excom-

municated. Second, that no one be married in church except after due preparation. Third, that the alterations to the table of prohibited degrees recommended by the "Palmer Report" and now before the Convocations be adopted. Fourth, that the Church of England follow the example of the Council of Trent and make celebration in church a condition of valid marriage between Christians. This is the most important and far-reaching of his suggestions. It means, in effect, that the Church would regard all "civil" marriages as invalid—that is, as unions which cannot be properly called marriages, and as a further consequence involves the excommunication of any baptized person who marries otherwise than in church. The ground on which Mr Macmillan recommends this step is that in England now in fact, though not in law, divorce is by mutual consent, and that the natural presumption—exactly opposite to the presumption entertained in the law courts—is that persons contracting in a register office do not intend to contract marriage—*i.e.*, an indissoluble life-long union—but a union "defeasible during life on the happening of one or other of certain specified events, and in truth and in fact defeasible by consent." This is a very attractive suggestion and deserves serious consideration. It would enable the hasty register office marriages of young persons, who though baptized were ignorant of Church law and indifferent to religious duties, and who subsequently obtain divorces, remarry, and desire the privilege of full Church membership, to be ignored as being, what in fact they most probably were, no marriages at all. But, and this is a point which Mr Macmillan does not mention, what would happen if two such persons did not divorce each other, but made a success of their marriage, and later wished to practise all their religious duties? Their marriage is deemed invalid; it is therefore concubinage. Must they publicly renew their consent? Lastly, Mr Macmillan recognizes that in the present state of affairs many of the marriages contracted in church are equally defective in intention. He suggests the creation of a tribunal which shall be competent to examine the circumstances in which such marriages took place, and to declare, if it seems clearly to be the case, that, in spite of the natural presumption that the parties meant what they said when they contracted, in fact they meant no such thing, and that therefore the marriage is void through defective intention. No doubt in its early stages this tribunal would have to deal with a great many cases, but as Mr Macmillan's other reforms began to take effect they would become fewer, and the presumption that a genuine marriage was intended harder and harder to rebut. Mr Macmillan also suggests that the Church should recognize the new grounds of nullity contained in the Herbert Act and accept the findings of the civil court in this respect. These new grounds can be justified, more or less, by the principles of the canon law, but it would, perhaps, be better if Mr Macmillan's new tribunal were entrusted with the task of examining for itself each case.

All of Mr Macmillan's suggestions are compatible with canon law and Catholic tradition. It is a pity that he does not always state their justification with absolute clarity. He has been a little misled by Watkins' book on marriage—it would have been better if he had pre-

ferred to be guided by Lacey—and by the actions of some Popes, into thinking that it is good canon law to regard heathen marriages as not indissoluble in theory, and, I suspect, that the indissolubility of Christian marriage arises from its sacramental nature. Neither of these is the case. Marriage is indissoluble by natural law, which covers heathen and Christian alike. But many heathen marriages are *de facto* null and void, or no marriages, because of some defect. The justification for Mr Macmillan's recommendations is that the bulk of present-day marriages are so defective. For the most part it is upon this that he rests his case, and it is a strong case. His book is timely and important. It deserves a wide public and serious consideration.

Christ Church, Oxford. Robert Mortimer.

Beyond Personality: The Christian Idea of God. By C. S. Lewis. Geoffrey Bles. 2s. 6d.

The Rights of Man and Natural Law. By J. Maritain. Geoffrey Bles. 5s.

Adam and Eve: an Essay Toward a New and Better Society. By J. Middleton Murry. Andrew Dakers. 10s. 6d.

I think it would be unprofitable to search for some common element in these three books which caused their despatch to me in the same parcel. All three authors ardently desire a better world and are working for it. These books are part of that work. But there the resemblance ceases. M. Maritain's essay first discusses the relation between the human person and society and then considers the rights of the person in the society so outlined. Mr Lewis sets out to describe the Christian belief and prints an expanded version of some talks broadcast in the spring of 1944. Mr Murry, in what his publishers describe as his "most important work," says that "something called 'Christian civilization' has finally disappeared"; that "the Church's thought of God has ceased to be the unique vehicle of the deepest truth for men"; that "the time is for ever past when men can believe in regeneration by the supernatural operation of the pure spirit"; and that therefore "we return, again and again, to the simple gospel: the regeneration of generation. Here or nowhere regeneration must begin."

Mr Lewis I can understand without any great difficulty. I did not hear him speak. Probably, if I had done, the reading of words written to be spoken would not have proved as distracting a business as it did. Beyond doubt those who heard these talks, and many others, will be glad to possess this volume. Mr Lewis' gift of illustration and of phrase is often to be observed. He is always arresting, always fair; and any tendency to criticize some of the ways in which he expresses himself is met in advance when he says to us, "Don't start quarrelling with other people because they don't use the same formula as you do." Most of us know quite a number of people who ought to read this book.

M. Maritain was much more difficult to understand. His space and his time were probably very limited, but I wish he could have been a little less austere and a little more free with illustration. I think he

would have helped more of us, at a point where we need help in the fundamentals of our thinking. For this is the kind of discussion which will assist towards clearer thought about the White Papers on Social Insurance and other problems of reconstruction. M. Maritain says that he intends to induce his readers to clarify their ideas upon the nature of society and the rights of human persons. Because "society is a whole made up of human persons . . . the mutual relationship between the individual and society is complex." It is this complexity which M. Maritain examines. "I am part of the State by reason of certain relationships to common life which call my whole being into play; but . . . there are in me gifts, rights and values which exist neither by the State nor for the State, and which are outside the sphere of the State." And "justice and law, by ruling man as a moral agent and appealing to reason and free will, deal as such with personality, and transform into a relation between two wholes—the individual and the social—what would otherwise have been a mere subordination of the part to the whole." In the second half of the book M. Maritain shows how human rights flow from natural law: "The notion of right and the notion of moral obligation are correlative"; and then considers the rights of the human, the civic, and the working person, exhibiting on the way his dislike of a planned economy, and at least one conspicuous point of contact with Mr Lionel Curtis. Once or twice I thought I noticed in his phrasing signs of that disjunctive outlook so unpleasantly exhibited in the poster about "your courage," and so on, "will bring us victory." But that is a minor point: these sixty pages are worth the work they demand.

I am not at all sure that I have understood Mr Murry. He sets out to discover "an answer to the question: What shall I—the individual person—do?" And he writes a book "about religion and love" "for the twenty-thirties." His quest is "a new harmony between the laws of Nature and the laws of God," and this effort "must be the work of dedicated man and dedicated woman." This will not come through Catholicism, for the supernatural has lost its authority. It will not come through Protestantism, which has perverted individuality into individualism by failing "to develop a sex-relation in which the true principle of individuality was expressed and glorified." It will come only when there is "a new love-relation between man and woman as individuals"; and in a "Christian regeneration of sex" or "a regeneration of Christianity by sex" lies Mr Murry's hope for "a new and better society."

Large parts of this book consist of intimate autobiography. We learn something of what D. H. Lawrence and Keats mean to Mr Murry ("in my experience the living Jesus and the living Keats tend to merge with one another"); and something more of what Blake means. And we learn much about Mr Murry. I should suppose that it cost him much to write this book. The agony of this war pressed hard upon him and laid on him the burden of finding words to express his "faith in life." He describes his life as "an effort to make sense of himself," and wishes that power had been given him "to say it simply." Extant Christianity offers no help in the creating of a new community. The

Church has "failed." It "legislates in a void." It is "shallow." And Mr Murry finds himself "a cleric without a church," at this crisis in history, when, to avert a totalitarian organization of society, a new community must come into being by the formation of voluntary co-operative groups seeking subsistence and livelihood from work on the land. These must be communities of families, and so require a solution of the problem of the nature of true marriage. In the recovery of tender fearless love in the man-woman relationship mankind can discover its need—"direct and incontrovertible experience of God"; for the act of human coition is "a lucid act of mutual adoration of visible and palpable God."

I say again that I am not at all sure that I have understood Mr Murry. It would be very easy to say of this book: "Here is another man with a bee in his bonnet about sex." But it would be quite untrue. It takes a long time to become accustomed to what Mr Murry has to say; and Mr Lewis' warning about not quarrelling with those who don't use the same formula as you do is very relevant here. For we are treading on holy ground. In April 1923 Katherine Mansfield died. Twenty years later Mr Murry writes: "Have I kept faith with the dead? The whole of this book is my answer." Those words give us a clue to the right understanding of these pages, and it is a clue which is worth while following.

H. C. L. Heywood.

Cambridge.

The Interpretation of the Bible. Edward Alleyn Lectures, 1943. Edited by C. W. Dugmore. S.P.C.K. 6s.

Mr Dugmore is to be congratulated on illuminating an ancient foundation and on gathering together an important group of Lectures. They are: (1) The Bible in the Early Church, by H. J. Carpenter; (2) The Faith of the Middle Ages, by Conrad Pepler, O.P.; (3) The Bible and the People: Protestant Views of the Authority of the Bible, by Albert Peel; (4) The Critical Approach to the Bible in the Nineteenth Century, by R. H. Lightfoot; (5) The Failure of Liberalism to Interpret the Bible as the Word of God, by T. W. Manson; (6) The Recovery of the Theological Interpretation of the Bible, by John Lowe. The book raises two main issues—the history of interpretation and the theological interpretation of the Bible. Though the book is not startlingly novel in its information—Miss Smalley's *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* and Miss Deanesly's *The Lollard Bible* being the main sources behind it—it gives a useful survey of the whole, and because not all the essayists stand on the same ground brings out the fact that the real question about the history of interpretation is the *perspective* in which the detailed facts are to be seen. It would have been even more profitable if each essayist had written a page of comment on each of the other essays; then the question of the perspective from which the History of Interpretation we so badly need should be written would have stood out more clearly.

The other issue is that of the theological interpretation of the Bible. While Dr Lightfoot rightly reminds us of the importance of the critical

studies of the nineteenth century, the last two essays supplement one another remarkably in the illumination of one of the major issues of our time. Dr Manson's powerful utterance confronts us with the Liberal subordination of biblical to non-biblical assumptions, with his own crucial affirmation that "conviction is one thing and revelation another," and on the basis of this with the assertion that "the first duty of theologians is to be not less but more theological, relentlessly and ruthlessly theological." The Dean of Christ Church begins by agreeing with R. H. Lightfoot and T. W. Manson in paying a tribute to the *theological* illumination which the nineteenth-century historical studies brought (I agree entirely with this, though I hope we are going to study carefully the relation between propositions and events and not to accept too easily a complete disjunction between them), but recognizes that there have been also serious disadvantages, none the less disadvantages because unintended and almost inevitable. He then considers the dangers of hasty theologizing—authoritarianism and arbitrary mysticism—and concludes with a firm but cautious insistence on the need for theological interpretation. There will be a certain "expectancy" of theological truth "even in passages hitherto stigmatized and discarded as secondary," and less time and attention will be devoted "to the interesting but relatively unimportant mass of 'background' information." To anyone who cares about the *interpretation* of the Bible as the standard and rule of Christian faith as something more than, though not separated from, *exegesis* in the strict sense, it is a pleasure to have the issue so authoritatively raised. It is clear both that the task is exceedingly difficult and also that it must be attempted. It is greatly to be hoped that this collection of essays will attract widespread attention and critical discussion.

BRADFORD. H. CUNLIFFE-JONES.

THE INTERPRETER SPIRIT AND HUMAN LIFE. By A. J. Macdonald. S.P.C.K. 6s.

These nine lectures are "a study of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament, the Wisdom Books, and the New Testament." They are excellently suited to the audiences to which they were addressed and will be found useful by many with whom the printed page must take the place of the spoken word. Not the least valuable thing in them is a careful examination, in chapter iv, of the occurrence throughout the New Testament of the terms "Spirit" and "Holy Spirit" with and without the definite article, and the rejection of the idea that "spirit" ever means merely a human attitude or frame of mind. There is also, in chapter vi, a useful and suggestive discussion of the relation between revelation, interpretation, and inspiration. One notes with approval that Dr Macdonald refers the origin of the title *Logos* to Old Testament, and not Hellenic, sources: and that he sees no unimpeachable evidences of what is barbarously called binitarian theology.

It is in no critical mood, but only in the hope of offering suggestions

towards making a good book better, that we venture to ask whether, upon further consideration, some things might not be differently expressed. For example, in such a sentence as "At thy rebuke, O Lord, at the blast of the breath of thy nostrils," are we bound to see any specific reference to the Holy Spirit, such as we are at least allowed to see in "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters"? Might it not be preferable to draw a distinction between the metaphor which is merely pictorial and the metaphor which has a theological import? Again, there is such a preponderance of patristic evidence in favour of the identification of Wisdom with the Word, rather than with the Holy Spirit, as to suggest that there is more to be said for that view than Dr Macdonald, in the good company of the compilers of the 1923 Lectionary, is disposed to admit; and one would ask whether those very Wisdom-passages which he quotes at length, so far from involving an identification of "Spirit" with "Wisdom," do not rather represent Wisdom as (logically at least) anterior to Spirit and as the source of Spirit's provenance or operation.

Dr Macdonald several times (pp. 15, 115, 119) objects to the statement of the Constantinopolitan Creed that the Holy Spirit "spake by the prophets," describing it as "another example of the hasty quotation of Scripture to which the framers of the Creed were prone." Consideration of the history of the Creed would perhaps persuade him that both this phrase and the term "only-begotten" (which he also regards as misplaced) neither were hastily quoted nor are misinterpretations of Scripture. An ancient type of creed, referred to by Justin, speaks of the Holy Ghost "who by the prophets proclaimed beforehand the things concerning Jesus," and this theme reappears in the Rule of the Faith as rehearsed by Irenæus, where the salient facts of the life of Christ are narrated in the third paragraph as proclaimed beforehand by the Holy Spirit. It is conceivable that their inclusion in this form was a protest against Marcionism, and that the summary expression of the Constantinopolitan Creed is a relic of this ancient statement, and still a safeguard against the same heresy, which in the fourth century was not quite dead in those territories from which the fathers of Constantinople for the most part came.

"The joy of Spirit-filled liberty is a better as well as a truer note for the life of modern man than this constant harping upon the Cross and all its so gloomy symbolism in architecture and ritual" (p. 149). Truly the Cross, with the themes of sin, righteousness, and judgment, of penitence and redemption, which it implies, is a stumbling-block to modern man; but it is questionable whether one who has refused to take up the Cross can ever become Christ's disciple and receive from Him the spirit of liberty.

It is possible that Dr Macdonald would somewhat revise pp. 106-107 on observing the original Latin of "incomprehensible" in the Athanasian statement of the Faith, and that he would alter part of what he says on p. 112 in reference to the Greek of "by him" in St John i, 3, 10. "During the Incarnation" (p. 120) suggests, though we are sure sure it is not meant so, that the Incarnation was a temporary episode; "the humanity of Jesus is now incorporated in the Godhead"

is probably not intendedly monophysite, though it would have pleased the promoters of that heresy.

Once more, this book ought to be read: if we have, with much deference, suggested reconsideration of some points, that is only because we are sure it will be read, and we should like to recommend it unreservedly.

E. Evans.

Hellifield.

This is the Message. A Continental Reply to Charles Raven. By Franz Hildebrandt. Lutterworth Press. 4s. 6d.

Professor Raven's eight letters based on Romans i-viii and published in 1943 under the title *Good News of God* aimed *inter alia* at "giving the rebuke which they deserve" to the "loud-voiced champions of a new and Biblical Theology." In this spirited and readable reply Niemöller's former "curate" has chosen attack as the best means of defence, saying that he is "overpointing the difference for the sake of clarity," as he hopes, "rather than out of sheer offensiveness."

It may be doubted whether these hopes have been realized and whether this method of "overpointing" the differences really makes for clarity, particularly when Dr Hildebrandt's own theses often seem inconsistent or unduly dogmatic. Thus he writes (p. 26), "God is hidden, not revealed, in the pages of history"—as if there were no history in the Bible, which is for him the paramount, if not the only, channel of revelation. He appears to read into the gospels a denial of *any* freedom of the human will on pp. 56-7, saying he would like a Greek expert to show him whether there are any words ending with "able" in the anthropology of the New Testament—a point he might have resolved by looking up "able" itself in a concordance. In speaking of verbal inspiration (p. 47) he seems to confuse "the Word" as Logos with "the Word" as Scripture; and whereas he normally regards the Bible and Reformation Confessions as self-authenticating, once at least he seeks to justify this by re-echoing (p. 11) the oft-repeated but never substantiated charge that the Liberal Protestant theologians in Germany "turned out to be, in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases, the champions of the 'German (Nazi) Christian' movement"; yet four pages later he himself writes that "not a few educated men who twenty years ago had the greatest difficulty with the pre-Copernican cosmology and the second advent of Christ have now thought it more honest to join . . . with the Confessional Church" (a term loosely used of various groups who have not subscribed formally to any single confession and whose unity, such as it is, comes from a common opposition to the "German-Christians"); and in point of fact the strongly orthodox Lutheran Church of Mecklenburg has become radically "German-Christian".

In discussing Dr Raven's thesis that there are other "symbols and instruments of deity" besides the sacraments, he omits the important qualifying words "in their measure" (p. 28), and he often (*e.g.*, pp. 24 and 56) seems to assume that all natural phenomena are on, or are reducible to, one low level which can only be contrasted, not compared, with the manifestations of divine grace; and so he quotes with

approval the Synod of Barmen's rejection of the "false doctrine that the Church might and must acknowledge as sources of its proclamation, except and beside this one Word of God (Christ), still other events, powers, forms and truths as God's revelation"—a statement which seems to contradict, *e.g.*, Psalm xix, 1; and this contradiction cannot honestly be slurred over by saying that "the heavens cannot 'declare the glory of God' to us without His Word (*sic*) 'converting the soul'; 'making the wise simple' (*sic!*)," etc., as he writes on p. 111.

In dealing with Christology Dr Hildebrandt tends to attribute to Dr Raven the view that the Incarnation was much on a level with other self-manifestations of God, and he even goes so far as to suggest that his "incarnational philosophy" is a "fundamentally gnostic attitude, leading dangerously near to a system in which Christ must figure as a means and not as an end." This comes near denying that Christ was a mediator—and it is hard indeed to credit Dr Raven with the extreme dualism of the Gnostics. It would seem that Dr Hildebrandt needs to make his meaning clearer here—and perhaps also deepen his knowledge of patristic thought, of which he modestly professes considerable ignorance. Apparently he is suspicious of any speculation not rooted in the terminology of Lutheranism or Kant, and he does not seem to have much of a faculty for realizing it when another thinker is making much the same point in different language. It is therefore to their mutual credit that he can also record some "surprising agreements" between himself and Dr Raven; but these again are partly due to the fact that they have long co-operated in a pacifist movement to promote understanding between the Christians of their countries. Although Dr Hildebrandt's book contains many interesting *obiter dicta*, especially some of the quotations from Luther, and although he is commendably candid about, *e.g.*, the weaknesses of German Lutheranism in the political sphere, it lacks the balance and breadth of vision needed to make any great contribution towards the better understanding of neo-Lutheran confessionalism among those Anglicans who find it difficult to appreciate; nor is it in every respect typical of that school of thought. But at least it raises many problems that are very pressing, and often it does more.

H. P. KINGDON.

OXFORD.

CORRECTION.—In the notice of *Home, Community and Church* (THEOLOGY, February, 1945, p. 48) for "a non-episcopal form of Church order" read "a mon-episcopal form of Church order."

NOTE.—The Rev. J. R. H. Moorman, B.D., Lanercost Priory, Brampton, Cumberland, has been invited to write a Life of Canon B. K. Cunningham, and would be glad to receive reminiscences, the loan of letters, etc.

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